Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

The State of Utah v. Frances Berenice Schreuder :
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Ronald J. Yengich; G. Fred Metos; Yengich, Rich, Xaiz & Metos; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Schreuder, No. 19588.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1689

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Pr5??

STATE OF UTAH,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

19588

FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDEP,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION OF
FIRST DEGREE MURDER RENDERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JUDGE, PRESIDING.

RONALD J. YENGICH
G. FRED METOS
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS
72 East 400 South, Suite 355
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

DAVID WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Buildinq
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

FILED
MAY

3 1985

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

vs.

:

FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No.

19588

:

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION OF
FIRST DEGREE MURDER RENDERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JUDGE, PRESIDING.

RONALD J. YENGICH
G. FRED METOS
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS
72 East 400 South, Suite 355
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

DAVID WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Buildinq
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
POINT I
AT TRIAL, NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED TO CORROBORATE
THE TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT ORDERED HER SON TO MURDER
HER FATHER
1
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE SAME AS ANY OTHER WITNESS.. 5
POINT II

B
A CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ON THE NATURE OF ACCOMPLICE
TESTIMONY WAS MANDATORY IN THIS CASE
6

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ALLOWING
THE INTRODUCTION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE AGAINST
APPELLANT
10
POINT III

B
HEARSAY STATEMENTS MADE BY APPELLANT TO MARC SCHREUDER
WERE INADMISSIBLE UNDER PULE 401 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE
13

POINT III
MARC SCHREUDER'S STATEMENTS TO DR. MOENCH ARE NOT
ADMISSIBLE UNDER ANY OF THE EVIDENTIARY THEORIES
ADVANCED BY RESPONDENT
POINT III

D

13
18

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S "DEATH QUALIFICATION" PROCEDURE
CONSTITUTED A DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO AN IMPARTIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE
JURY
18
POINT V - VIII

19

POINT IX
APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY CITED THE RECORD IN HEP
APPELLATE BRIEF - THEREFORE, THIS APPEAL SHOULD NOT
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
BEDigitized
DISMISSED
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED
CONCLUSION

21

CASES CITED
Mannino v. International Manufacturing Co., 650 F.2d 846 (6th Cir.
1981)
16
State v. Chang, 374 P.2d 5 (Haw. 1962)
State v. Clark, 3 Ut.2d 382, 284 P.2d 700 (1959)
State v. Moore, Utah (No. 18737, file 2-1-85)
State v. Steqgell, 660 P.2d 252 (1983)

6
2, 3, 4
18
19, 20

State v. Wood, 648 P. 2d 71 (Utah 1981)

7

United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1983)

17

United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1983)...... 17
United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980)

14, 15

United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384 (2nd Cir. 1980)

17

United States v. Stuart, 718 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1983)

17

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-7, 1953 as amended

7

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
4 Wigmore, Evidence, §1128 at 268 (Chabourn rev. 1972)

17

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 75 (D) ( 2) ( 2) (d)

19

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103

10

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401

13

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404

10

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 405

10

Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 703
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14, 15, 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED (continued)
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 705
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 (d)(1)(B)
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(4)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
14, 17, 18
14

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

vs.

:

FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No.

19588

:
POINT I

AT TRIAL, NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED TO
CORROBORATE THE TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT
ORDERED HER SON TO MURDER HER FATHER.
The evidence introduced at trial, at best, corroborates
several uncharged allegations rather than the offense appellant
was charged

with

committing.

Both parties agree that Marc

Schreuder, being the actual killer of Franklin Bradshaw, is an
accomplice. (See respondent's brief at p. 29.)

However, respon-

dent's analysis of the criminal liability of Richard Behrens
completely disregards the ruling of the trial court. Futhermore,
the testimony of Vittorio Gentile and Miles Manning does nothing
to establish that the appellant aided, encouraged, solicited,
requested or encouraged Marc Schreuder to kill Franklin Bradshaw.
Respondent argues, in its brief, that Richard Behrens
was not an accomplice.

However, the trial court had ruled

otherwise when discussing appellant's motion to dismiss.
that time, the court stated:
I think Mr. Behrens was an accomplice, it
appears. [sic] He encouraged, aided,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

At

abetted, although the killing and death of
Franklin Bradshawf although he was not
directly connected with the place or where,
[sic] he is an aider and abettor... (R.
2554)

;

Prior to thatf the court had ruled that the testimony of Miles
Manning and Vittorio Gentile corroborated the testimony of Marc
Schreuder and

neither

of

those

two

With respect

to

Behrens

were

accomplices.

(R.

2553)
it

is

obvious

he

was

an

accomplice based on his testimony that he made attempts to locate
a qun for appellant and Marc Schreuder for the purpose of killing
Franklin Bradshaw.

The gun was to be used for the purpose of

killing Franklin Bradshaw.

(R. 1993)

The last reguest by Marc

Schreuder for Behren's to obtain a gun was within a month or
month and one-half of the actual homicide.

(R. 1993)

Behrens

made attempts to locate a gun by talking to certain persons in
New York

City about the availability

of firearms.

(R. 1992)

Later, Behrens received the murder weapon (R. 1994) and concealed
it in his

apartment

for

approximately

giving it to appellant's

sixteen months

sister, Marilyn

Reagan.

(R.

before
2016)

This was done after appellant refused to repay him some $3,700
which was missing from a joint checking account.
Behrens aided Marc

(R. 2009-2016)

Schreuder with the reguisite

intent to be

considered an accomplice. Consequently, Behrens is an accomplice
in the murder of Franklin Bradshaw and his testimony cannot be
used to

corroborate

the

testimony

of

Marc

Schreuder.

In State v. Clark, 3 Ut.2d 382, 284 P.2d 700 (1959),
the defendant

was

charged

with

the

offense

of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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abortion

by

instrument.

The woman who had an abortion testified and the

only corroborative

evidence of that testimony

introduced

at

trial was abortion inducing medications found in the defendants
possession.

This court found that evidence to be insufficient

to corroborate the offense of abortion by instrument.

In the

instant case, appellant was charged with the murder of her
father.

In its answer to appellant's motion

for a bill of

particulars, the state specified that the homicide was committed
by Marc Schreuder who was aided, encouraged, solicited or reguested by appellant.

(R.

212)

The testimony of Miles Manning

and Vittorio Gentile does not corroborate this charge.
At best, these two witnesses

corroborate unrelated

attempts or conspiricies. However, there were no allegations of
a conspiracy to commit a homicide, nor were charges of attempted
homicide alleged in the Information.

(R. 44) Manning testified

that he was introduced to appellant by Richard Behrens in 1977.
(R. 2132-2134) He claimed that he later received $5,000 from
appellant to kill a man that she eventually identified as her
father.

(R. 2138-2140)

Manning stated that he did nothinq to

carry out the murder, but stayed three days at the YMCA then
lied to appellant, claiming he was arrested in Salt Lake City.
(R. 2140-2143)

This evidence does not corroborate Marc Schreuder's

crucial testimony that he, Marc, killed his grandfather at his
mother's insistance

and

instigation.

As

in

State v. Clark,

supra, this testimony establishes a different offense and does
nothing more than cast a suspicion on appellant by implicating
her in an attempt, by means of another instrumentality (Miles
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Manning rather than Marc Schreuder), to cause the death of her
father.
The testimony of Vittorio Gentile also involved another uncharged allegationf

and did nothing to establish that

appellant ordered her son to kill her father.
an incident that occurred

Gentile described

in the sprinq of 1978, when he was

having lunch with the appellant:
0: [by Mr. Jones] Was there any discussion
at that lunch about her father, Franklin
Bradshaw?
A. There was only one discussion after we
finish [sic] lunch that was talked about.
Something she mentioned, something one thing
[sic] to put a contract on her father.
0. Mr. Gentile, do you recall
statement came about or h o w —

how

that

A. No, it was iust out of the blue sky.
(R. 1836)
The only thing that this testimony corroborated was a statement
by Marc Schreuder that in February or March of 1978 his mother
called him and stated she had hired a hit man from out of state
to kill her father.

(R. 1763-1764)

of Miles Manning, does

not

tend

This, like the testimony

to establish

that

appellant

requested or ordered her son, Marc, to kill her father.

Once

again, it corroborates an uncharged allegation which under the
rule set forth in State v. Clark, supra, is not sufficient to
corroborate the crucial testimony of Marc Schreuder that he was
acting at the direction of his mother when he killed his grandfather.
In conclusion, this court's ruling in State v. Clark,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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supra, requires that corroborative evidence tend to establish
the offense charged.

Further, evidence of related but uncharged

allegations is insufficient corroboration.

In this case there

is nothing

of

to

corroborate

the

testimony

Marc

Schreuder

that he killed Franklin Bradshaw at the instigation and insistence of

his mother.

Nor does

it

establish

aided, abetted, encouraged, directed,

that

solicited

or

appellant
requested

Marc Schreuder in causing the death of Franklin Bradshaw.

At

best, the evidence offered as corroboration of Marc Schreuder's
testimony would tend to prove uncharged allegations of attempted
homicide or conspiracy to commit homicide.

Consequently, ap-

pellant's conviction must be reversed and the charge of criminal
homicide must be ordered to be dismissed.
POINT II
A
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT TESTIMONY
OF AN ACCOMPLICE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE
SAME AS ANY OTHER WITNESS.
Respondent gives no argument in its brief supporting
or justifying the instruction to the jury directing the jury to
weigh the

testimony

of an accomplice

the

witness.

(See instruction No. 33 (R. 818))

same

as any

other

The policy estab-

lished in the case law regarding the tesitmony of accomplices
as described in appellant's brief and the problems in assessing
that credibility

likewise

is unchallenged

by the state.

The

error and prejudicial nature of that error are established in
appellant's brief and need not be reiterated here.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B
A CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ON THE NATURE OF
ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY WAS MANDATORY IN THIS
CASE.
Respondent, in its brief, argues that the failure to
give the cautionary portion of an instruction on the testimony
of witnesses who were accomplices was not error for three basic
reasons:

First, because

the

instruction

went

far enough

describing how to weight the witnesses' credibility.
the instruction misstated
Finally, there
instruction:

was

no

in

Secondly,

the facts of the case and the law.

showing

of

the prerequisites

for the

that the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated

or that the testimony was either

contradictory, uncertain

or

improbable.
The instruction

which
and

was

given

Richard

stated

Behrens

that

all

Marc

Schreuder, Miles

Manning

received

certain promises

for their testimony and this could be taken

into consideration in weighing the credibility of these witnesses.

(R. 803)

the obvious.

Such an instruction does nothing more than state
As noted in appellant's brief (pp. 22-23) two of

the witnesses (Behrens and Marc Schreuder) were accomplices and
the instruction did not go far enough in informing the jury of
the problems

with

accomplice

testimony.

State v. Chang,

374

instruction misstating

the

P.2d 5 (Haw. 1962) .
As for the
facts of

the

issue of the

case, appellant

raised

only

the

issue

of

the

failure of the trial court to give the cautionary sentence of
the instruction.

The trial court did not hesitate to change

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the factual statement of that instruction and appellant does
not question those chanqes.
to correctly

state the

Since the instruction was modified

facts

and

was

qiven

in partf

this

arqument carries no weiqht.
As for the contention that the cautionary instruction
did not meet the requirements of Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-7
(1953 as amended) a close analysis of the statute is required.
That statute provides:
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court f an
instruction to the jury may be qiven to the
effect that such uncorroborated testimony
should be viewed with caution, and such an
instruction shall be qiven if the trial
judqe finds the testimony of the accomplice
to be self contradictory, uncertain or
improbable. [Emphasis added]
As can be seen from the construction of the statute a cautionary
instruction is discretionary
uncorroborated.

See

also

if the accomplice

State v. Wood, 648

testimony is

P.2d

71

(Utah

1981), where this court found that a confession by the defendant
was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony. However,
in this case the accomplice testimony was not corroborated.
See Point I, supra, and Point I of appellant's brief (p. 8-18)
Under the statute, a cautionary instruction is mandatory if the accomplice testimony is contradictory, uncertain or
improbable.

There are many contradictions and uncertainties in

the testimony of these witnesses. Furthermore, the circumstances
of the case demonstrate the improbability in the evidence. The
fact that Marc Schreuder failed to fully reveal the promises
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

given to him by the state is a prime example of the uncertainties
of his testimony.

(See Point VI of appellant's brief.)

Marc

Schreuder had not previously testified but had sat through his
own preliminary hearing and trial where both Manning and Behrens
testified.

Consequently,

contradiction in

his

there

is

testimony

an

with

unsurprising
respect

to

lack

the

of

other

witnesses.
Behren's testimony and
contradictions.
three versions
homicide:
he received

statements were replete with

In various prior statements, he gave at least
of

how

he

received

the

firearm

used

in

the

(1) he received it from the appellant (R. 1995); (2)
it

Marilyn Reagan

from Marc
had

the

Schreuder

gun all

of

(R.

2022);

the time

and

(R.

(3) that

2025-2026).

Behrens also testified that it would not be fair to describe
his contacts with the appllant in the fall of 1977 as occasional,
this directly
trial.

(R.

contradicted
2043-2044)

introduced Miles

Manning

his

testimony

Behrens
to

at Marc

further

the

testified

appellant

apartment house where he lived.

Schreuder's

(R. 2089)

in

front

Manning

that

he

of

the

initially

told police that his first meeting with the appellant was at
her apartment.

(R. 2157)

With the passing of time Manning's

memory improved so his description of this initial meeting was
identical to Behren's testimony and thus "corroborative" testimony.

(R.

2134)

Interestingly,

Manning

did

not

remember

Behren's name until it was given to him by Salt Lake County
Attorney's office investigators.
taping his

initial

(R. 2176) Furthermore, prior to

statement, Manning

spoke

to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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investigators

for a full hour.

(R. 2150) In this same regard, Marc Schreuder

testified that he was taken out of the prison by Sargeant Mike
George, of the Salt Lake County Attorney's office, on several
occasions.

(R. 1870)

He was allowed to visit with his father,

Vitterio Gentile, at a hotel room.

(R. 1871)

He also met with

Ernie Jones, the prosecutor on the case, on several occasions
at the Salt Lake County Attorney's office.

(R. 1875)

Further-

more, George took Marc Schreuder out of the prison to see the
movies with his girlfriend (R. 1872) and to go to the University
to be inducted into an honors society.

(R. 1872-3)

Sargeant

George was the investigator assigned to the appellant's case.
(R. 2451-2452)
These inconsistencies and changes in the witnesses'
testimony in themselves merit a cautionary instruction.

When

the changes in testimony are considered in conjunction with the
actions of the state's investigators in the case in allowing
the witnesses to meet, and in all likelihood, discuss their
testimony and

with

the

Schreuder, a cautionary
because the

improbability

additional

favors

instruction
of

the

provided

was mandated.

testimony

to Marc
This

is

is established.

Under these circumstances, it would have been proper for the
trial court to give the instruction sua sponte.

The prejudicial

effects of the failure to give this instruction were discussed
in appellant's brief and need not be rejected (see appellant's
brief p. 23).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT III
i

A
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY ALLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF CHARACTER
EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT.
1
At trial, the court allowed Dr. Louis Moench to describe the relationship between Marc Schreuder and appellant as
it had

been

related

to him

by Marc

Schreuder.

One

of

the

effects of this testimony was to allow evidence of bad character,
in violation of Rule 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Respondent argues that there was no specific objection on the
basis of character evidence made to this testimony.

Secondly,

respondent argues that such evidence was merely cumulative.
Respondent relies

on Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of

Evidence in claiming there must be a statement of the specific
grounds for objection to claim error on appeal.

However, under

that rule, it is sufficient if the grounds for the objection were
apparent from the context
case an

objection

threat of suicide.

was

in which they were made.

made

(R. 1947)

to

testimony

about

In this

appellant's

From this context, it is obvious

that in addition to the hearsay guestion, this objection
made to evidence of character or bad acts of appellant.

was

Like-

wise, more general objections were made regarding the content
of the statements related to Dr. Moench by Marc Schreuder.

(R.

1946, 1951)
Respondent also argues that appellant's rights were not
substantially affected by Dr. Moench1s testimony because it was
Digitized by the Howard
Hunter Law Library, of
J. Reuben
Clark Moench's
Law School, BYU. testimony is
merely cumulative.
TheW.majority
Dr.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

set out

in

appellant's

brief.

In essence, Moench

describes

a situation where Marc Schreuder and his brother, Larry, were
continually being locked out of appellant's apartment, requiring
them to sleep in stairwells.

She would not allow him to have

friends, would threaten to disown him, would threaten to move
to Harlem, or live in the gutter.

Dr. Moench also described

how appellant had been seeing a psychiatrist and how, when he
moved, Marc Schreuder took the psychiatrist's place in counseling appellant.

(R. 1947-1951)

When Marc Schreuder testified he did not mention the
majority of

the

information

described

to

Dr. Moench.

With

respect to being locked out of the home he described one incident
that he remembered when he was 13 or 14 years old.
He also described

one

incident where

his mother

(R. 1823)

struck

him.

Further, he stated that she out pressure on him and "harped" at
him all of the time.
described by Dr.

(R. 1823)

None of the other incidents

Moench were related in court by Marc Schreuder.

Other evidence

cited

by

respondent

as

making

Dr.

Moench's testimony cummulative included Richard Behrens' statements:

"appellant would

get upset but

it would

blow over",

(R. 1987), she got angry and went into a rage when he demanded
money from her (R. 2009), finally, he was aware that appellant
had locked Marc Schreuder out on occasion but he did not know
of any incident where Marc was locked out for a week at a time.
(R. 2109)

Vittorio Gentile

testified

that he would

have to

strike or beat appellant on occasion, and that was to bring her

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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out of

hysterical

convulsions.

(R. 1850)

Marilyn

Reagan,

appellant's sister, stated there would be times that appellant
would become hysterical
was answered

(R. 2407)

This

in conjunction with questions about appellant's

marital problems
Gentile.

and loose control.

resulting

from

physical

abuse

by Vittorio

With these witnesses, including Marc Schreuderf the

statements reqarding appellant's character arose from isolated
questions with each witness.

Never was a long involved discus-

sion of appellant's character described

by Dr. Moench.

The

effect on the jury from those witnesses could not have near the
impact that Dr. Moench's testimony had.
As for the testimony of Steven Kleinf that was given
over objection

by

defense

counsel.

(R. 2437f

2440)

That

evidence did not relate to appellant's relationship with Marc
Schreuder.

Similar to the testimony just described, the effect

of Klein's

testimony

was

insignificant

in

relation

to Dr.

Moench's.
In conclusion, the nature of the evidence from witnesses other than Dr. Moench relating to appellant's character
was not cumulative.

Essentially, the other witnesses described

appellant's temper. They did not describe the specific incidents
as related by Dr. Moench. Nor was the majority of the testimony
given by

these

witnesses

focused

Conseguently, the error committed

on

appellant's

character.

at trial in admitting the

testimony of Dr. Moench regarding the character of appellant
was prejudicial, requiring reversal of the judgment and conviction.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B
HEARSAY STATEMENTS MADE BY APPELLANT TO
MARC SCHREUDER WERE INADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE
401 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires the
trial court to weigh the probative value of evidence against
its prejudicial effect to determine if the evidence is admissible.

Respondent argues that the testimony of Dr. Moench was

probative in that his opinion tended to establish that appellant
exercised great emotional influence over Marc Schreuder.
(Respondent's brief at p. 45)

In this veinf respondent also

argues that the hearsay statements from Marc Schreuder to Dr.
Moench were merely cumulative.
addressed.

This argument has already been

(See Point III A, supra) However, even if it did

merely amount to cumulative evidence its probative effect is
then substantially diminished. As for the opinion, that evidence
could be admissible without the hearsay statements being introduced.

The prejudicial

nature and magnitude of the acts

described by Dr. Moench far outweigh the probative value of
such evidence.

Conseguently, the hearsay statements by Marc

Schreuder to Dr. Moench should have been excluded.
C
MARC SCHREUDER'S STATEMENTS TO DR. MOENCH
ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER ANY OF THE EVIDENTIARY THEORIES ADVANCED BY RESPONDENT.
Respondent argues, in its brief, that statements by
Marc Schreuder to Dr. Moench are admissible under three separate
theories.

First, the

state

claims that the statements are
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{

admissible because

they

were

relied

upon

by Dr. Moench in

making his medical diagnosis, pursuant to Rule 803(4) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.

Second, the statements are claimed to

be admissible as the basis of an expert opinion, pursuant to
1

Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Finally, the statements
are claimed admissible as prior consistent statements, pursuant
to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
With respect to the issue of diagnosis and treatment,
the court in United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.
1980), in dealing with an identical federal rule, held that a
two prong

test

for

admissibility

must

be met

before

such

statements would be admitted:
... first is the declarant's motive consistent with the purpose of the rule,m and
second, is it reasonable for the physician
to rely on the information in diagnosis or
treatment. 633 F.2d 77 at 84.
Thus, this test requires that, before such statements
are admissible, there must be a showing that the statements
have some indicia of reliability.

Respondent's position, on

the other hand, seem to be that statements made to a physician

1. The purpose of the rule had been described earlier in the
case:
It focuses upon the patient and relies upon
the patient's strong motive to tell the
truth because diagnosis or treatment will
depend in part upon what the patient says.
It is thought that the declarant's motive
guarantees trustworthiness sufficiently to
allow an exception to the hearsay rule.
633 F.2d 77 at 83-84.
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for the purpose of diagnosis should be admissible without making
any showing of reliability.

Appellant submits that the test

for admissibility as described in Iron Shell, supra , should be
adopted by this court.

Such a rule would prevent situations

such as occurred in the instant case where virtually anything
can be said to a physician and these statements could then be
introduced into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
When the Iron Shell test is applied to the instant
case, the statements

in question become

inadmissible.

Marc

Schreuder's motive in providing information to Dr. Moench was
to provide himself with a defense to the charge of first degree
murder by placing the blame on his mother.

As for the second

prong, it would not be reasonable to rely on Marc Schreuderfs
statements as they were made during the course of two interviews,
each of which lasted only two hours.

(R. 1945)

Since the

evidence in question here fails both prongs of the Iron Shell
test it lacks the reguisite reliability and is inadmissible.
Respondent's reliance on Rule 703 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence is also misplaced.

A reading of the rule shows

that it merely allows an expert to rely on evidence that has
not been presented in court.
Rule 703. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY
EXPERTS.
The facts or data in the particular case
upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearinq. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
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Analyzing this rule

in conjunction with Rule 7052

reinforces appellant's position, because Rule 705 allows an
expert to testify without disclosing the underlying facts or
data upon which he bases his opinion.

In Mannino v. Interna-

tional Manufacturing Co., 650 F.2d

(6th Cir. 1981), the

846

trial court had ruled that an expert's opinion was based on
material not properly gualified as a basis for expert opinion.
In finding that this ruling was in error, the Court of Appeals
stated:
The purpose of Rule 703 is to make available
to the expert all of the kinds of things
that an expert would normally rely upon in
forming an opinion, without requiring that
those be admissible in evidence. Under the
Rule, the expert is free to give his opinion
relying on the types of data an expert
would normally use in forming an opinion in
his area of expertise. In short, through
Rule 703, the law is catching up with the
realities of professional life. 650 F.2d
at 851.
Rule 703

of the Utah

Rules

of Evidence does

not

provide a basis for the admissibility of evidence. Conseguently,
this rule cannot be used as a justification for admitting Marc
Schreuder's statements to Dr. Moench.

2.

Rule 7 05 provides:
Rule 705.
DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATE
(SIC) UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION
The expert may testify in terms of opinion
or inference and give his reasons therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be
reguired to disclose the underlying facts
or data on cross-examination.
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Finally, respondent

relies

on Rule

801(d)(1)(B)

of

the Utah Rules of Evidence as a basis' for the admissibility of
Marc Schreuder's statements to Dr. Moench.

That rule provides:

A statement is not hearsay if...the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement and the statement is...consistent with his testimony and is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge against
him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.
One commentator has stated,
A consistent statement at a time prior to
the existence of a fact said to indicate
bias, interest, or corruption, will
effectively explain away the force of the
impeaching evidence; because it is thus
made to appear that the statement in the
form now uttered was independent of the
discrediting influence.
4 Wigmore, Evidence §1128 at 268 (Chadbourn rev. 1972)
The appellate

courts

have

interpreted

an

identical

federal rule to reguire that the prior consistant statement be
made at a time prior to the existence of a motive to falsify.
United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384 (2nd Cir. 1980); United
States v. Stuart, 718 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Feldman, 711

F.2d

758

(7th

Cir.

1983);

United States v.

Henderson, 717 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1983).
In this case Dr. Moench was originally
aid in Marc Schreuder's defense.

(R. 927, 868)

retained to

Marc Schreuder

made the statements to Dr. Moench to attempt to get a reduction
in the degree of the offense with which he was charged - from a
capital offense

to

a

second

degree

felony.

statements to Dr. Moench were made well

(R. 868)

The

after the motive to
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fabricate existed and thus were inadmissible under Rule 801(1)
(d)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Marc Schreuder's

statements

to Dr. Moench are not

admissible under any of the theories advanced by the respondent.
As described above (see Point III A, supra) the evidence is not
cumulative.

The prejudicial effect of the evidence was described

in appellant's brief and need not be repeated here.
J
'D:
Appellant submits this point based on the argument
previously made in her brief on appeal.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT1S "DEATH QUALIFICATION" PROCEDURE CONSTITUTED A DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S
SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO AN
IMPARTIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE JURY.
Appellant acknowledges State v. Moorey Utah (No. 18737f
file 2-1-85) , which was recently decided by this court.

<

In

Moore , supra , this court ruled that any prejudice created by
excluding potential

jurors who would never impose the death

(

penalty was off-set by also excluding those who were "automatic
death-penalty" prone.
Appellant understands this holding.

However, it is

<

appellant's contention, as was argued in her original brief,
that discussing the issue of "death penalty" at all, creates a
natural inclination on the part of juries to convict.

Appel-

lant has cited in her brief the numerous studies supporting
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(

this argument.

Thus, appellant respectfully requests this court

to reconsider this issue in this specific context.

POINTS V - VIII
Respondent raises no issues of fact or law not addressed in

appellant's

these points

based

on

brief.
the

Therefore,

arguments

appellant

presently

submits

before

the

court.

POINT IX
APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY CITED THE RECORD IN
HER APPELLATE BRIEF - THEREFORE, THIS APPEAL
SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED.
In its brief, respondent

has correctly

pointed

out

that Rule 75 (p)(2)(2)(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires appellant's brief to contain "a concise statement of
the material facts of the case citing the pages of the record
supporting such statement".

Respondent then cites a number of

Utah cases in which this court has stated that a failure to
comply with

Rule

75

can

be

the

basis

for

dismissing

an

appeal.
However, the instant case differs substantially from
those cited by respondent.

Because of the length of appellant's

brief and the number of issues involved, counsel intended that
the initial statement of facts be used merely as an overview of
the case.
In State v. Stegqell, 660 P.2d 252 (1983), which was
cited in respondent's brief, this court noted that the defenDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dant's brief contained

"absolutely no references to the trial

record or transcript to support his factual allegations" (660
P.2d at 253).

In the instant case, appellant's initial statement

of facts was intended to qive this court a qeneral idea as to
the nature of this appeal.
Upon readinq appellant's brief, the court should note
that each specific arqument is supported by facts that properly
recite the
appeal.

trial transcript, which

is part of the record

on

Unlike Steqqell, supra, and the other cases cited by

respondent, appellant's

brief

cites

the

record

on

numerous

occasions, in each particular argument.
If, in the instant case, appellant had recited all of
the facts and cites to the record in her initial statement of
facts, such

statement would have

each of those

facts would have

been unduly lenqthy.

been repeated

in each of the

separate arquments, thus creatinq needless repetition.
it is economical

to

initially, in a

case

cite
such

the

record

as this,

and
it

all

Also,

Althouqh

relevant

becomes

facts

necessary

to

adjust one's approach for the sake of clarity and brevity.
Appellant has sufficiently cited the record in statinq
the facts

relevant to each argument.

Although there has not

been strict compliance, the length of her brief necessitated a
slight variance.

Therefore, this appeal should not be dismissed

for the above stated reasons.
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CONCLUSION
The relief sought by appellant is to have her judgment
and conviction for the offense of criminal homicide murder in
the first degree reversed and the case remanded to the Third
District Court with an order to either:

impose a judgment of

acquittalf give appellant a new trial, or impose a judgment
and conviction for the lesser and included offense of criminal
homicide, murder in the second degree.
Dated this

J

day of Ma#-r--l-$85.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

Statutes, Pules of Evidence and Jury Instructions
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I

STATUTES
§77-31-18. Conviction on testimony of accomplice.
A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless
he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself and
without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to
connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and
the corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows
the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
(Repealed 1980)
§77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice - Instruction
to jury.
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury
may be given to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony
should be viewed with caution, and such an instruction shall be
given if the trial judge finds the testimony of the accomplice
to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.
RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 103
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is on admitting evidence,
a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record,
stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground
was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the
court by offer or was apparent from the context within which
guestions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other
or further statement which shows the character of the evidence,
the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the
ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in question
and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury.
In jury cases, proceedings shall be
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by an means,
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions
in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice
of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were
by theattention
Howard W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
not brought Digitized
to the
ofLibrary,
the
court.
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RULES OF EVIDENCE CONTINUED
RULE 401
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of conseguence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.
RULE 703
BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence.

DISCLOSURE OF

FACTS

RULE 705
OR DATA UNDERLYING

The expert may testify in terms of
give his reasons therefor without
underlying facts or dataf unless the
The expert may in any event be reguired
facts or data on cross examination.

EXPERT

OPINION

opinion or inference and
prior disclosure of the
court reguires otherwise.
to disclose the underlying

RULE 801
DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement.
A "statement" is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended
by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testified
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the witness denies
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent
with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charged against
him of recent fabrication or improper influence
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RULES OF EVIDENCE CONTINUED
Rule 801 (continued)
or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his
individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of
which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or
(C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
RULE 8 02
HEARSAY RULE
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these
rules.

HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS;

RULE 803
AVAILABILITY

OF

DECLARANT

IMMATERIAL

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness:
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment
and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diaanosis or treatment.
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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INSTRUCTION #
You are instructed that three witnesses, Marc Schreuder,
Richard Behrens and Myles Manning have each been granted
immunity from prosecution for various crimes. You are to
view their testimony with the utmost scrutiny and caution.
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INSTRUCTION
An "accoipllce"
tarily, and with common
crime; he is one who

Is

a

N Q ^ ^

_

person

who

knowlngly f

volun-

In tent , unites In the commission of a

could be charged

with the commission of

the crime.
A conviction

may

not

rest

on

the

testimony

of

an

accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which
in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice
tends

to connect

the defendant

with the commission of the of-

fense.
The testimony of such an accomplice
however, where

there

the accomplice

which,

facts

in

evidence,

the information
implicated

and

is

when

tends

was

evidence

to

show

with

Such corroborating
material

facts

as testified

sources

considered

committed

connected

from

the

by

the

that

the

need

other

charged

defendant
of

not go

the accomplice,

than

with

crime

commission

evidence

other

together

that

and

is corroborated

the

in
was

crime*

to all the

nor

need

the

corroboration be sufficient in itself to support a conviction;
it may

be

ever, the

slight

and

entitled

corroborating

to little

evidence

must

consideration.

connect

the

with the commission of the offense and be consistent
guilt

and

inconsistent

with

her

innocence

and

must

How-

defendant
with her
do

more

than cast a grave suspicion on the defendant.
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INSTRUCTION
Page 2

NO.

^

Where the testimony is corroborated by other evidence
the testimony

of

consideration

an

accomplice

entitled

to

as you would give to any other witness.

that a person is an accomplice
he is not

is

a credible

witness

his testimony.

However,

you would

weigh

the

take into

consideration

should

testimony

motive or lack of motive

any

is no reason

of

bias,

to testify

weigh

any

other

interest,

hf^

for

or

any

fairly.
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that

rejecting

testimony

witness

same

The fact

to a crime is no evidence
and

you

the

and

as
may

probable

INSTRUCTION NO.

M.

You are instructed that Marc Schreuder, Richard Behrens
and Miles Manning have received certain promises from the prosecutor in exchange for their testimony,

You may consider this fact

in weighing the credibility of their testimony.

V
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